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Abstract
The problem of private information retrieval gets renewed attentions in recent years due to its information-theoretic
reformulation and applications in distributed storage systems. PIR capacity is the maximal number of bits privately
retrieved per one bit of downloaded bit. The capacity has been fully solved for some degenerating cases. For a general case
where the database is both coded and colluded, the exact capacity remains unknown. We build a general private information
retrieval scheme for MDS coded databases with colluding servers. Our scheme achieves the rate (1+R+R2+· · ·+RM−1),
where R = 1− (
N−T
K )
(NK)
. Compared to existing PIR schemes, our scheme performs better for a certain range of parameters
and is suitable for any underlying MDS code used in the distributed storage system.
Index Terms
Private information retrieval, distributed storage system, PIR capacity
I. INTRODUCTION
The classic model of a private information retrieval (PIR) scheme, first introduced by Chor et al. [9], [10], allows
a user to make queries to several servers storing the same database and retrieve a certain bit of the database via the
feedbacks, without revealing the identity of the specific bit to any single server. Ever since its introduction, PIR has
received a lot of attention from the computer science community and cryptography community. The main research
objective is to minimize the total communication cost for retrieving a single bit from an n-bit database, where the
communication cost includes both the upload cost (the queries sent to the servers) and the download cost (the feedbacks
from the servers). A series of works have managed to reduce the communication cost, see for example, [5], [11], [12],
[29], [30] and the references therein.
While the classic model of PIR has been extensively studied, PIR gets renewed attentions in recent years, mainly
due to the following two aspects. First, PIR could be reformulated from an information-theoretic point of view. Instead
of retrieving a single bit from an n-bit database, the information-theoretic PIR problem considers retrieving a single
file from an n-file database, where the length of each file could be arbitrarily large. The research objective is then
minimizing the total communication cost per unit of retrieved data. It is further noticed in [8] that in this information-
theoretic model the upload cost could be neglected with respect to the download cost. Second, original PIR schemes are
restricted to replicated-based databases, i.e., every server stores the whole database. With the development of distributed
storage system (DSS), it is natural to consider designing PIR schemes for coded databases [2], [7], [8], [18].
Currently there are mainly two lines of research regarding the information-theoretic and DSS-oriented PIR problems.
One originates from [13], [14], where PIR codes and subsequently PIR array codes are introduced. These codes
characterize how to design distributed storage systems that may emulate any classic k-server PIR scheme, with relatively
a smaller storage overhead. Researches along this line include, for example, [1], [6], [17], [27], [31].
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2The other line, which is the focus of this paper, is the fundamental limits on PIR capacity for a general PIR
scheme defined as follows. Assume we have a coded database containing N servers storing M files. Each file is stored
independently via the same arbitrary (N,K)-MDS code. Any T out of the N servers may collude in attacking on the
privacy of the user. We call the PIR scheme for such a system as an (N,K, T ;M)-scheme. PIR rate is defined as the
number of bits of messages that could be privately retrieved per one bit of downloaded message. The supremum of
all achievable rates is called the PIR capacity, denoted by C = C(N,K, T ;M). In the pioneering work [21] of Sun
and Jafar, the exact PIR capacity for the case K = T = 1 is completely solved. Later [22] deals with the case when
K = 1 and T is arbitrary, i.e., colluded databases. Then [3] deals with the case when T = 1 and K is arbitrary, i.e.,
coded databases. The PIR capacity for all the three models above are of the same form:
C = (1 +R+R2 + · · ·+RM−1)−1, (1)
where C equals 1/N , T/N or K/N accordingly.
For the databases both coded and colluded, i.e., K ≥ 2 and T ≥ 2, determining the exact value of PIR capacity is
difficult. In [24], [25] a PIR scheme for the case T +K ≤ N is posed and it has PIR rate 1K+T . In [15] Freij-Hollanti
et al. introduce a PIR scheme with rate N−K−T+1N for any T + K ≤ N . So far this result is the best among known
PIR schemes for a large range of parameters. However, one limitation of this result is that it depends on some special
properties of the underlying MDS code used in the coded database. For example, the scheme in [15] holds when the
storage code is a generalized Reed-Solomon code. But for any other arbitrary storage code, it is uncertain whether
similar results hold. Based on the intuition from existing explicit expressions shown in (1), in [15] Freij-Hollanti et al.
further conjecture that if T +K ≤ N , then the optimal PIR capacity is given by
C = (1 +R+R2 + · · ·+RM−1)−1, R = T +K − 1
N
. (2)
In a very recent work [20], the conjecture above is disproved by analyzing the case with parameters N = 4, T = 2,
K = 2 and M = 2. The conjectured capacity is 4/7 while [20] poses a scheme with rate 3/5 > 4/7. A further
counterexample is a complete analysis of the case with parameters M = 2 and K = N − 1 [20]. For the other
parameters, whether the conjecture (2) holds or not is an open problem on both sides, i.e., we neither have an explicit
PIR scheme achieving this capacity nor have a good upper bound of the optimal capacity (which may require a subtle
analysis using information inequalities).
In this paper, our main contribution is a general PIR scheme for the case T +K ≤ N with rate given by
C = (1 +R+R2 + · · ·+RM−1)−1, R = 1−
(
N−T
K
)(
N
K
) . (3)
Several remarks on this PIR scheme are as follows.
• For a certain range of parameters, our scheme has better rate than any other existing scheme.
• For the degenerating cases, i.e., either K = 1 or T = 1, our rate agrees with previous results. For the non-
degenerating cases, note that our rate in (3) is strictly smaller than the conjectured value (2). So our scheme offers a
lower bound of the optimal capacity and does not provide more counterexamples for the conjecture by Freij-Hollanti
et al.
• When the number of files M is large, the scheme by Freij-Hollanti et al. in [15] is better than ours. However,
as already mentioned, their results rely on certain properties of the underlying storage code while ours is a general
scheme suitable for any (N,K)-MDS code.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the general model of the PIR problem.
In Section III we present our main contribution and analyze its rate. In Section IV we make a comparison of some
known PIR schemes. Section V concludes the paper.
3II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section we introduce the general model of the PIR problem. Basically the statement follows the same way
as shown in [3], [20]–[22].
The general model considers a distributed storage system consisting of N servers. The system stores M files, denoted
as W [1],W [2], . . . ,W [M ] ∈ FL×Kq , i.e., each file is of length LK and represented in a matrix of size L×K. The files
are independent and identically distributed with
H(W [i]) = LK, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}, (4)
H(W [1],W [2], . . . ,W [M ]) = MLK. (5)
Denote the jth row of the file W [i] as w[i]j ∈ FKq , 1 ≤ j ≤ L. Each file is stored in the system via the same given
(N,K)-MDS code. The generator matrix G ∈ FK×Nq of the MDS code is denoted as
G =
[
g1 g2 · · · gN
]
K×N
, (6)
and the MDS property means that any K columns of G are linearly independent. For each w[i]j , the nth server stores
the coded bit w[i]j gn. Thus, the whole contents yn ∈ FMLq stored on the nth server are the concatenated projections
of all the files {W [1],W [2], . . . ,W [M ]} on the encoding vector gn, i.e.,
yn =
 W
[1]
...
W [M ]
gn (7)
=
[
w
[1]
1 gn · · · w[1]L gn w[2]1 gn · · · w[2]L gn · · · w[M ]1 gn · · · w[M ]L gn
]T
. (8)
Now assume that a user wants to retrieve an arbitrary file W [i]. This is done by sending some queries to the servers
and then getting the feedbacks. Let F denote a random variable generated by the user and unknown to any server. F
represents the randomness of the user’s strategy to generate the queries. Let G denote a random variable generated by
the servers and also known to the user. G represents the randomness of the server’s strategy to produce the feedbacks1.
Both F and G are generated independently of the files and the identity of the desired file, i.e.,
H(F ,G, i,W [1],W [2], . . . ,W [M ]) = H(F) +H(G) +H(i) +H(W [1]) + · · ·+H(W [M ]). (9)
Using his strategy F , the user generates a set of queries Q[i]n to the nth server, 1 ≤ n ≤ N . The queries are
independent of the files, i.e.,
I(Q
[i]
1 , Q
[i]
2 , . . . , Q
[i]
N ;W
[1],W [2], . . . ,W [M ]) = 0. (10)
Upon receiving the query, the n-th server responds a feedback A[i]n , which is a deterministic function of the query
Q
[i]
n , the strategy G and the data yn (and therefore a deterministic function of the query Q[i]n , the strategy G and the
files {W [1],W [2], . . . ,W [M ]}), i.e.,
H(A[i]n |Q[i]n ,G,yn) = H(A[i]n |Q[i]n ,G,W [1],W [2], . . . ,W [M ]) = 0. (11)
The user retrieves his desired file based on all the queries and feedbacks, plus the knowledge of the strategies F
and G, i.e.,
H(W [i]|Q[i]1 , Q[i]2 , . . . , Q[i]N , A[i]1 , A[i]2 , . . . , A[i]N ,F ,G) = 0. (12)
1The role of G deserves a special remark. This is first proposed by Sun and Jafar in [20]. In almost all previous PIR schemes we follow a
question-and-answer format, i.e., for any query vector the server responds the corresponding projection of his contents onto the query. By bringing
a strategy G into consideration, the server can perform some coding procedures before responding and thus could reduce the download cost. For
more details please refer to [20] or the discussions in Section IV.
4For any subset T of the servers, |T | = T , let Q[i]T represent {Q[i]n , n ∈ T }. Similarly we have the notation A[i]T . The
PIR scheme should ensure that this set of servers learns nothing about the identity of the retrieved file, i.e.,
I(i;Q
[i]
T ) = I(i;A
[i]
T ) = 0, ∀T ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}, |T | = T. (13)
The rate for the PIR scheme is defined as the ratio of the size of the retrieved file to the total download cost, i.e.,
H(W [i])∑N
n=1H(A
[i]
n )
, (14)
and the PIR capacity C is the supremum of all achievable rates.
III. A GENERAL PIR SCHEME
In this section we introduce our main result. We first demonstrate the basic idea via two explicit examples before
analyzing the general scheme.
A. N = 4, K = 2, T = 2 and M = 2
Denote the two files by U and V and assume that each file is of length 72 and represented in a matrix of size 36×2,
i.e.,
U =
( u1
...
u36
)
V =
( v1
...
v36
)
(15)
where ui ∈ F2q and vi ∈ F2q , 1 ≤ i ≤ 36. Here Fq is a sufficiently large finite field2. Let U be the desired file.
Choose a random matrix S1 ∈ F36×36q uniformly from all the 36× 36 full rank matrices over Fq . Construct a list of
atoms3 a[1:36] = S1U . Note that this is only a formal expression and should be understood as follows. For example, if the
first row of S1 is the vector (p1, p2, . . . , p36), then a1 represents the linear combination a1 = p1u1+p2u2+· · ·+p36u36.
Choose a random matrix S2 ∈ F36×36q uniformly from all the 36 × 36 full rank matrices over Fq . Suppose there
exists a (36, 30)-MDS code and the transpose of its generator matrix is denoted as MDS36×30. Select the first 30 rows
of S2, denoted as S2[(1 : 30), :]. Construct a list of atoms b[1:36] = MDS36×30S2[(1 : 30), :]V . Note that this is only
a formal expression and should be understood as follows. For example, if the first row of MDS36×30S2[(1 : 30), :] is
the vector (q1, q2, . . . , q36), then b1 represents the linear combination b1 = q1v1 + q2v2 + · · ·+ q36v36.
The atoms a[1:36] and b[1:36] will form the queries for the servers. The queries for the servers are divided into eleven
blocks. In ten blocks each query is only a single atom and in one block Λa+b each query is a combination of two
atoms. The query structure is as follows.
Λxλ :
{ Server I Server II Server III Server IV
x6λ+1 x6λ+1 x6λ+2 x6λ+2
x6λ+3 x6λ+4 x6λ+3 x6λ+4
x6λ+5 x6λ+6 x6λ+6 x6λ+5
}
for λ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, x ∈ {a, b} and
Λa+b :
{ Server I Server II Server III Server IV
a1 + b1 a1 + b1 a2 + b2 a2 + b2
a3 + b3 a4 + b4 a3 + b3 a4 + b4
a5 + b5 a6 + b6 a6 + b6 a5 + b5
}
.
2The only constraint on size of the field is to allow the existence of an MDS code used in the construction later.
3Here we use the word “atom” to represent a query only related to one single file. The query related to more than one file will then be consisted
of several atoms. This is for reducing too frequent appearances of the word “query”, which is annoying and may lead to confusion.
5Recall that the n-th server, 1 ≤ n ≤ 4, has stored yn =
(
U
V
)
gn, where G =
[
g1 g2 g3 g4
]
2×4
is the generator
matrix of the (4, 2)-MDS code used to encode the files. Therefore, each server knows the 72 bits {uign : 1 ≤ i ≤ 36}
and {vign : 1 ≤ i ≤ 36}. Upon receiving the query of the form ai + bj , the n-th server responds with (ai + bj)gn,
which is a linear combination of the 72 bits stored on the server.
Retrieving the file U is equivalent to retrieving a[1:36] since S1 is a full rank matrix. Note that a[7:36] and b[7:36] could
be retrieved since each appears as a query on two different servers and any two of the four vectors {g1,g2,g3,g4}
are linearly independent. Then b[1:6] could be solved from b[7:36] due to the property of MDS36×30. Therefore, the
interferences can be eliminated in the block Λa+b and thus a[1:6] could be retrieved as well.
The scheme is private against any two colluding servers. From the perspective of any two colluding servers, they
have received 25 atoms ai, 25 atoms bj and 5 mixed queries. So altogether they have 30 distinct atoms towards the
file U and 30 distinct atoms towards the file V . Extract the coefficients of each atom as a vector in F36q . Recall how
we select the random matrices S1, S2 and the (36, 30)-MDS code. It turns out that the 30 vectors with respect to each
file form a random subspace of dimension 30 in F36q , so the two servers cannot tell any difference between the atoms
towards different files and thus the identity of the retrieved file is disguised.
The rate of the scheme above is then 36×212×5×2+12 =
6
11 .
B. N = 4, K = 2, T = 2 and M = 3
We now show how the scheme works with one more file than the previous example. Now we have three files U , V
and W . Let each file be of length 432 and represented in a matrix of size 216× 2, i.e.,
U =
( u1
...
u216
)
V =
( v1
...
v216
)
W =
( w1
...
w216
)
(16)
where ui,vi,wi ∈ F2q , 1 ≤ i ≤ 216. Here Fq is a sufficiently large finite field. Let U be the desired file.
Similarly as the previous example, we shall construct three lists of atoms a[1:216], b[1:216] and c[1:216], corresponding
to one of the files accordingly. These atoms then form the queries to the servers. That is, any query for any server
is either a single atom, or a combination of two atoms, or else a mixture of three atoms. We first present the query
structure before explaining how to construct the atoms. Similarly as above, the structure is divided into several blocks.
Λa+b+c :
{ Server I Server II Server III Server IV
a1 + b1 + c1 a1 + b1 + c1 a2 + b2 + c2 a2 + b2 + c2
a3 + b3 + c3 a4 + b4 + c4 a3 + b3 + c3 a4 + b4 + c4
a5 + b5 + c5 a6 + b6 + c6 a6 + b6 + c6 a5 + b5 + c5
}
,
Λb+cλ :
{ Server I Server II Server III Server IV
b6λ+1 + c6λ+1 b6λ+1 + c6λ+1 b6λ+2 + c6λ+2 b6λ+2 + c6λ+2
b6λ+3 + c6λ+3 b6λ+4 + c6λ+4 b6λ+3 + c6λ+3 b6λ+4 + c6λ+4
b6λ+5 + c6λ+5 b6λ+6 + c6λ+6 b6λ+6 + c6λ+6 b6λ+5 + c6λ+5
}
for λ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
Λa+bλ :
{ Server I Server II Server III Server IV
a6λ+1 + b6λ+31 a6λ+1 + b6λ+31 a6λ+2 + b6λ+32 a6λ+2 + b6λ+32
a6λ+3 + b6λ+33 a6λ+4 + b6λ+34 a6λ+3 + b6λ+33 a6λ+4 + b6λ+34
a6λ+5 + b6λ+35 a6λ+6 + b6λ+36 a6λ+6 + b6λ+36 a6λ+5 + b6λ+35
}
for λ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
6Λa+cλ :
{ Server I Server II Server III Server IV
a6λ+31 + c6λ+31 a6λ+31 + c6λ+31 a6λ+32 + c6λ+32 a6λ+32 + c6λ+32
a6λ+33 + c6λ+33 a6λ+34 + c6λ+34 a6λ+33 + c6λ+33 a6λ+34 + c6λ+34
a6λ+35 + c6λ+35 a6λ+36 + c6λ+36 a6λ+36 + c6λ+36 a6λ+35 + c6λ+35
}
for λ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
and finally
Λxη :
{ Server I Server II Server III Server IV
x6η+61 x6η+61 x6η+62 x6η+62
x6η+63 x6η+64 x6η+63 x6η+64
x6η+65 x6η+66 x6η+66 x6η+65
}
for x ∈ {a, b, c} and η ∈ {1, · · · , 25}.
Independently choose three random matrices S1, S2, S3 ∈ F216×216q , uniformly from all the 216 × 216 full rank
matrices over Fq . The atoms a[1:216] are built just by setting a[1:216] = S1U .
Suppose there exists a (36, 30)-MDS code and the transpose of its generator matrix is denoted as MDS36×30. Select
the first 30 rows of S2, denoted as S2[(1 : 30), :]. Then b[1:36] are built by setting b[1:36] = MDS36×30S2[(1 : 30), :]V .
Similarly c[1:36] = MDS36×30S3[(1 : 30), :]W . Note that here we are using the same (36, 30)-MDS code.
We pause here to explain the functions of the atoms defined so far. Notice that {bi + ci : 7 ≤ i ≤ 36} could be
retrieved since each appears as a query in two different servers. Then due to the property of MDS36×30, we can solve
{bi + ci : 1 ≤ i ≤ 6} from {bi + ci : 7 ≤ i ≤ 36}. Therefore the interferences can be eliminated in the block Λa+b+c
and thus a[1:6] could be retrieved. This is exactly how we make use of the side information provided by a combination
of the files V and W , to retrieve some messages of the desired file U hidden in the form of a mixture of all three files.
The targets of the other atoms follow the same idea, i.e., we want to make use of the side information provided
only by V (respectively, only by W ) to retrieve some messages of the desired file U hidden in the combination of the
files U and V (respectively, the combination of the files U and W ). This is done in separate parallel steps. Divide the
query structure {Λa+bλ : 1 ≤ λ ≤ 5}, {Λa+cλ : 1 ≤ λ ≤ 5}, {Λxη : x ∈ {b, c}, 1 ≤ η ≤ 25} into the following separate
groups:
Γxλ =
{
Λa+xλ , {Λxη : 5λ− 4 ≤ η ≤ 5λ}
}
, x ∈ {b, c}, 1 ≤ λ ≤ 5.
In each Γxλ we can select the atoms as
b[6λ+31:6λ+36]
⋃
[30λ+37:30λ+66] = MDS36×30S2[(30λ+ 1 : 30λ+ 30), :]V
or similarly
c[6λ+31:6λ+36]
⋃
[30λ+37:30λ+66] = MDS36×30S3[(30λ+ 1 : 30λ+ 30), :]W.
Retrieving the file U is equivalent to retrieving a[1:216] since S1 is a full rank matrix. Retrieving a[67:216] is
straightforward and we have explained how to retrieve a[1:6]. In each Γbλ or Γ
c
λ we have the atoms a[6λ+1:6λ+6]
or a[6λ+31:6λ+36] accompanied by the interferences b[6λ+31:6λ+36] or c[6λ+31:6λ+36]. Due to the MDS property we can
solve these interferences via b[30λ+37:30λ+66] or c[30λ+37:30λ+66]. Once eliminating these interferences, we are able to
retrieve a[7:66].
The scheme is private against any two colluding servers. From the perspective of any two colluding servers, they
have received atoms towards a single file 125 times each, queries towards a combination of two files 25 times each
and finally 5 queries towards a mixture of all the three files. So altogether the number of atoms towards each of the
three files is 125 + 25× 2 + 5 = 180. Extract the coefficients of each atom as a vector in F216q . Recall how we select
the random matrices S1, S2, S3 and the (36, 30)-MDS code. It turns out that the 180 vectors with respect to each file
form a random subspace of dimension 180 in F216q , so the two servers cannot tell any difference among the atoms
towards different files and thus the identity of the retrieved file is disguised.
The rate of the scheme above is then 216×212×25×3+12×5×3+12 =
36
91 .
7C. The general framework
From the illustrations of the two examples above, we proceed to explain the general framework of our PIR scheme.
Denote the files as W [1],W [2], . . . ,W [M ]. Each file is of length LK and represented in a matrix of size L×K over
Fq , where L is a constant to be computed later. Fq is a sufficiently large field that allows the existence of an MDS
code used in the scheme later. Each file, say W [m], consists of L rows, w[m]1 ,w
[m]
2 , . . . ,w
[m]
L . For each file W
[m] we
will build a list of L atoms, where each atom is a linear combination of {w[m]1 ,w[m]2 , . . . ,w[m]L }. Let W [1] be the
desired file. Constructing the PIR scheme contains the following steps.
• Step 1: Independently choose M random matrices, S1, . . . , SM , uniformly from all the L× L full rank matrices
over Fq . Then the atoms for W [1] are just built by S1W [1].
• Step 2: Let α and β be the smallest positive integers satisfying
α
(
N
K
)
= (α+ β)
((
N
K
)
−
(
N − T
K
))
. (17)
Assume the existence of an
(
(α + β)
(
N
K
)
, α
(
N
K
))
-MDS code. The transpose of its generator matrix is denoted as
MDS(α+β)(NK)×α(NK).
• Step 3: We need an assisting array of size (N−1K−1)×N consisting of (NK) symbols. Each symbol appears K times
and every K columns share a common symbol. For example, when N = 4, K = 2 the array is of the form{ 1 1 2 2
3 4 3 4
5 6 6 5
}
.
• Step 4: [Construction of the query structure] The query structure is divided into several blocks, where each block
is labelled by F ⊆ {W [1],W [2], . . . ,W [M ]}, a subset of files. In a block labelled by F , the queries are of the same
form, i.e., every query is a mixture of |F| atoms related to the files in F . We set each block in an “isomorphic” form
with the assisting array, i.e., every K servers share a common query. For example, each block of queries in the previous
examples is isomorphic with the assisting array above.
We further call a block labelled by F a t-block if |F| = t. For any F ⊆ {W [1],W [2], . . . ,W [M ]}, |F| = t, we
require that the number of t-blocks labelled by F is αM−tβt−1. For example, in Subsection B, α = 5 and β = 1. So
we have one 3-block labelled by a+b+c (equivalently, the set {U, V,W}), five 2-blocks for each label a+b, a+c, b+c
(equivalently, the sets {U, V }, {U,W} and {V,W}) and twenty-five 1-blocks for each label a, b, c (equivalently, the
singleton set {U}, {V } and {W}).
• Step 5: [Dividing the query structure into groups] Now let F denote a nonempty set of files not containing
the desired file W [1]. There are totally αM−|F|β|F|−1 blocks labelled by F and αM−|F|−1β|F| blocks labelled by
F ⋃{W [1]}. Divide these blocks into αM−|F|−1β|F|−1 groups, denoted by ΓFλ , 1 ≤ λ ≤ αM−|F|−1β|F|−1, where
each group consists of α blocks labelled by F and β blocks labelled by F ⋃{W [1]}. Repeat this process for every
nonempty set of files not containing the desired file W [1] and thus the whole query structure is divided into groups.
• Step 6: [Constructing the atoms for each group] For each group constructed with respect to F and any file W [m]
in F , the number of atoms towards W [m] within the blocks in this group is (α + β)(NK), among which α(NK) atoms
appear in blocks labelled by F and the other β(NK) atoms appear as interferences in blocks labelled by F ⋃{W [1]}.
Let these (α+ β)
(
N
K
)
atoms for W [m] be built by MDS(α+β)(NK)×α(NK)S
′
mW
[m], where S′m denotes some α
(
N
K
)
rows
in the matrix Sm.
8Repeat this process for all the groups. Note that we shall come across the same file W [M ] several times. We have(
M−2
|F|−1
)
choices for a subset F of size |F|, containing W [M ] but without W [1]. With respect to any such F we have
αM−|F|−1β|F|−1 groups. So the exact number of times we come across W [M ] can be computed as
M−1∑
|F|=1
αM−|F|−1β|F|−1
(
M − 2
|F| − 1
)
= (α+ β)M−2. (18)
Every time we come across the same file W [M ], we have to ensure that the rows we select from Sm are non-
intersecting. This is guaranteed as long as
(α+ β)M−2α
(
N
K
)
≤ L. (19)
• Step 0: We leave the determination of L here since its value is deduced based on all the steps above. However,
we call this step by Step 0 since the value of L should be used from the very beginning. L is exactly the number of
distinct atoms towards the desired file. So L can be computed as
L =
(
N
K
) M∑
|F|=1
αM−|F|β|F|−1
(
M − 1
|F| − 1
)
=
(
N
K
)
(α+ β)M−1. (20)
One can see that the value of L will guarantee the correctness of the inequality (19).
D. Analysis of the PIR scheme
The underlying (N,K)-MDS code used in the distributed storage system guarantees that any K encoding vectors
are linearly independent. Thus each query in the scheme can be retrieved since the same query appears in K distinct
servers. For each group constructed above with respect to F , based on the property of the ((α+ β)(NK), α(NK))-MDS
code, those α
(
N
K
)
queries in the blocks labelled by F will help us eliminate the interferences of the β(NK) queries in
the blocks labelled by F ⋃{W [1]}, and thus the β(NK) atoms towards W [1] are retrieved. The retrieval for those atoms
towards W [1] not interfered are straightforward. As a result, all the atoms a[1:L] are successfully retrieved, which is
equivalent to the retrieval of the desired file W [1], since S1 is of full rank.
The scheme is private against any T colluding servers. From the perspective of any T colluding servers, for each
group constructed above with respect to F , they shall receive (α + β)((NK) − (N−TK )) atoms towards each file, say
W [m] ∈ F . By the equality (17) this number is exactly α(NK). Extract the coefficients of the atom as a vector in FLq .
Recall how we build the atoms in this group and the property of the
(
(α+β)
(
N
K
)
, α
(
N
K
))
-MDS code. One can see that
the vectors will form a random subspace of dimension α
(
N
K
)
in FLq . Moreover, recall that the atoms towards W [m] in
different groups are made from non-intersecting rows of Sm and Sm is of full rank. Thus in the whole query structure,
the vectors of all the atoms towards W [m] will form a random subspace of dimension (α+ β)M−2α
(
N
K
)
in FLq . This
property also trivially holds for the file W [1]. So these T colluding servers cannot tell any difference among the atoms
towards different files and thus the identity of the retrieved file is disguised.
Finally we compute the rate of our PIR scheme. The retrieved file is of length LK. The download cost in any block
is K
(
N
K
)
. So the rate can be computed as
LK
K
(
N
K
)∑M
|F|=1 αM−|F|β|F|−1
(
M
|F|
) = L(N
K
)
β−1
(
(α+ β)M − αM) = 11 + αα+β + · · ·+ ( αα+β )M−1 .
A final remark is that our scheme, like most existing schemes, only works for the case T +K ≤ N since otherwise
the equality (17) does not make sense. Another way to explain this limitation is as follows. We build the queries
according to the assisting array. If T +K > N then every T servers will know all the queries and all the atoms and
thus no side information can be used.
9To sum up, our main result is as follows.
Theorem 1: When T +K ≤ N , there exists an (N,K, T ;M)-PIR scheme with rate (1 +R+R2 + · · ·+RM−1)−1,
where R = 1− (
N−T
K )
(NK)
.
IV. A COMPARISON WITH KNOWN PIR SCHEMES
In this section we briefly discuss some other known PIR schemes for MDS coded databases with colluding servers
and make some comparisons.
First of all, for the degenerating cases, i.e., either K = 1 or T = 1, the rate of our scheme agrees with previous
results in [3], [21], [22]. For the non-degenerating cases, one can see that our rate is strictly smaller than the conjectured
capacity in (2). So our result offers a lower bound of the capacity and does not provide any counterexamples to the
conjecture by Freij-Hollanti et al.
The scheme by Freij-Hollanti et al. in [15] has rate N−K−T+1N . One drawback of the scheme is that the underlying
MDS code in the distributed storage system should satisfy some certain properties. Regardless of this drawback, the
scheme performs very well when the number of files M is relative large and performs bad when M is relatively small.
One can see that given N , K and T , the rate of our scheme is a strictly decreasing function of M and the limitation
is (
N−T
K )
(NK)
. The rate of the scheme in [15] is a constant independent of M and N−K−T+1N is larger than
(N−TK )
(NK)
. So
there will be a threshold M(N,K, T ). Our scheme is better when the number of files is less than M(N,K, T ) and the
scheme in [15] is better otherwise. As an example, consider the case with parameters N = 30, K = 20 and T = 10.
R1 represents the rate for our scheme, shown in the red curve with circles. R2 represents the rate of the scheme by
Freij-Hollanti et al., shown by the green straight line. C denotes the conjectured capacity by Freij-Hollanti et al. in
(2), shown in the blue curve with triangles. Then the threshold is M(30, 20, 10) = 30 (when the number of files is
exactly 30, our scheme has a better rate with only a slight difference of 1.6× 10−8).
The recent work by Sun and Jafar in [20] is remarkable since it allows a coding strategy for the servers before
responding. This has been a blind spot for all previous works and also the current draft. Simply speaking, the idea in
[20] is to make the query space (spaces spanned by the query vectors) larger for the desired file and smaller for the
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other files. The query space is sent to each server individually (unlike in our scheme which contains mixed queries).
The servers perform some coding procedures to produce some feedbacks which is a mixture of several files and thus
reduce the download cost. By analyzing the case with parameters N = 4, K = 2, T = 2 and M = 2, the scheme
in [20] has rate 35 , which is larger than the conjectured optimal value
4
7 and consequently larger than
6
11 in our first
example. Another important advantage of the scheme by Sun and Jafar is that, as far as we know, it is the first scheme
suitable for the case T +K > N .
However, a naive generalization of the scheme in [20] seems to be not satisfying. Suppose the dimension of the
query space for the desired file is D and the dimension of the query space for any other file is d. Then the scheme
based on the same idea will only have a rate DD+d(M−1) , which tends to zero very fast with the growing of M . So
the scheme in [20] may only have very good performance when the number of files is very small. Maybe we have not
captured the essence of the scheme in [20] and its generalization will be of great interest.
Finally we show a comparison of all the schemes with the running example throughout the draft, N = 4, K = 2
and T = 2. The meanings of R1, R2 and C are as mentioned above. R3 represents the rate of the new scheme by Sun
and Jafar (or more precisely, its generalization based on our understanding), shown in the black curve with squares.
R1 R2 R3 C Order
M = 2 0.5454 0.2500 0.6000 0.5714 R3 > C > R1 > R2
M = 3 0.3956 0.2500 0.4286 0.4324 C > R3 > R1 > R2
M = 4 0.3219 0.2500 0.3333 0.3657 C > R3 > R1 > R2
M = 5 0.2786 0.2500 0.2727 0.3278 C > R1 > R3 > R2
M = 6 0.2506 0.2500 0.2308 0.3041 C > R1 > R2 > R3
M = 7 0.2312 0.2500 0.2000 0.2885 C > R2 > R1 > R3
When M = 2, R3 is the largest, which results in a counterexample to the conjecture by Freij-Hollanti et al. R3 still
performs well when the file number is 3 or 4, but no longer violates the conjecture. When M = 5 or M = 6, our
scheme becomes the best. When M ≥ 7, the order is then always C > R2 > R1 > R3.
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V. CONCLUSION
We have constructed a general private information retrieval scheme for (N,K)-MDS coded database with arbitrary
T -colluding servers. The rate of our scheme is (1 + R + R2 + · · · + RM−1)−1, where R = 1 − (
N−T
K )
(NK)
. Our scheme
performs better than existing schemes for a certain range of parameters. One more advantage of our scheme is that
it works for any underlying MDS code used in the distributed storage system. In general, determining the exact PIR
capacity when K ≥ 2 and T ≥ 2 is far from solved. New schemes increasing the rate (even only for a small range of
parameters) and new upper bounds for the capacity will be of great interest.
In the end we briefly introduce various other models on PIR. The symmetric PIR problem is considered in [23] and
[28], where a further constraint is that the user should know nothing about any non-retrieved file. [4] considers the
model for retrieving P ≥ 2 files and shows that one can do better than the trivial approach of executing P independent
PIR schemes. [19] discusses multi-round PIR schemes, where the queries and feedbacks are made in several rounds
and the user may adjust his queries according to the feedbacks from previous rounds. [26] considers arbitrary collusion
patterns instead of the original “T out of the N servers may collude” model. [16] considers the model replacing the
underlying MDS code by some non-MDS code.
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